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May 172017
 

It may not be very funny, but the funny thing about WannaCrypt is that it is somewhat of a failure! Unless the authors are spectacularly stupid (not entirely impossible incidentally), they have no way to recover their ill-gotten gains. The pile of looted bitcoins they have acquired is fully visible, so any attempt to use those coins will almost certainly result in them being tracked down – they have attracted too much attention.

Which is another aspect of the WannCrypt malware – it has highlighted the vulnerability (MS17-010) and caused a huge vulnerability hunt. Which is causing those who wrote other malware (such as Adylkuzz) to gnash their teeth, because otherwise their malware would have quietly worked away in the background. The malware authors behind Adylkuzz have probably made more money than the WannaCrypt malware authors … and may well get away with their loot too.

Which is why other malware authors “wannacry” – the attention that WannaCrypt has gotten has ruined MS17-010 for them.

May 172017
 

It seems rather strange when you discover it, but Windows Update sometimes lies about what updates have been installed. I am not sure how often this happens, but it does happen from time to time. Which with WannaCrypt rampaging around is somewhat unfortunate.

What seems to happen is that Windows Update gets confused about what patches it has installed – it’s internal database gets corrupt. One possible fix for this is to remove the database :-

net stop wuahuserv
cd %systemroot%
ren SoftwareDistribution SoftwareDistribution.old
net start wuauserv
rd /s/q SoftwareDistribution.old

When using Windows 10, you may well have to start (net start wuahuserv) Windows Update services before stopping them. Once you have removed the directory, the next time you run Windows Update in the gooey, it will spend some time rebuilding it’s database and hopefully will then pick up the missing updates. No promises but this worked on at least one server that had unacknowledged missing patches.

Of course without a proper vulnerability scanner it may be tricky to determine when Windows is lying about being fully patched. The best bet is to assume it is lying whenever something like WannaCrypt comes along.

The other possibility is to look into something like Autopatcher which is intended for offline updates – you can download the Microsoft updates and use the tool to patch Windows computers from the downloads.

Apr 062017
 

One of the possibilities when setting a password is to use non-ASCII characters, such as ¨þ¨ (that is a thorn). Well perhaps something a little more secure than just a single character.

But just how sensible is it?

The first thing to bear in mind is that you need to be able to enter the password reliably in all circumstances. A tale from the mists of time: I once set a root password on a Unix machine that included the ¨@¨ character, which normally worked fine but failed on the system console because on that terminal the old Unix tty was still active and ¨@¨ would erase a line, making it impossible to enter the password.

Fortunately I realised what the problem was before it became more than a little annoying.

But the point still remains – if you cannot type a password, you cannot authenticate. So for passwords such as firmware passwords, system encryption passwords, or normal computer account passwords, a password containing Unicode characters is probably a very bad idea.

But for when you have full control over your computer(s), such as for web account passwords, a password containing Unicode characters is worth considering.

So how safe is a password containing a Unicode character anyway? Well, on my usual password cracking machine, john the ripper is unable to crack the password ¨þ¨ in approximately 24 hours. Of course that is a bit of a cheat as john the ripper does not by default check Unicode characters, and if it did it would be able to crack a one character password. But it would take longer; adding Unicode characters increases the space that john the ripper needs to search in order to find your password.

And perhaps more importantly makes it less likely for a password guesser (Hydra for example) to be successful.

So if you normally use a password such as thistlethinthorn, changing it to þistleþinþorn is worth considering. Or indeed changing the separator between words in a multiword password to a Unicode character: thistle☠thin☠thorn, or red¡whistle¡wheel.

Feb 122017
 

A very long time ago, I used to collect spam in order to graph how much spam a single mail server was likely to get over time, and almost as long ago, I lost interest in maintaining it. As a consequence I still get a ton of spam every day and after a long period of procrastination I have been slowly raising defences against spam.

This particular recipe is not really a defence against spam – it verifies that the remote server is properly DNS registered with a reverse DNS registration – in other words that the IP address it is connecting from is registered. This is a requirement for all mail servers, and as it turns out, spammers don’t care for registering their servers in the DNS.

This ACL snippet goes into the ACL for checking the recipient or for checking the message :-

 deny
   message = Your mail server is not properly DNS registered
   log_message = BLOCKED: No rDNS
   condition = ${if eq{$host_lookup_failed} {1} {1}{0}}
   # Check rDNS and block if not registered

There are three items of interest :-

  1. The message is intended to be easily read by recipients to determine what the problem is. It turns out that many people do not read NDRs, but if we get the message right at least we are doing the right thing.
  2. The log_message is intended to make automating log parsing easier.
  3. Within the condition, the $host_lookup_failed variable indicates that the reverse DNS lookup returned NXDOMAIN and not that it timed out (which would be $host_lookup_deferred).

That’s all there is to this little piece of configuration.

Feb 082017
 

One of the things that come up whenever IPv6 is mentioned on certain news sites, is that there are people out there who think that NAT solves all of the address size problems and doesn’t have any negatives. I could present a whole series of blog articles on why NAT is the work of the devil, and presents a clear and present danger to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (I might be exaggerating just a touch here).

The naive approach to a security issue originating from a certain network address is to block that network address permanently, pending an appropriate response, or temporarily. Not a bad idea although it does resemble a game of hunt the wumpus, and to assist in this, there are community based collective blocklists.

But what happens when you block an address, and that address is the public address of a NAT device? You block everyone sharing that public address, which could be just a household or it could be thousands of unconnected people. For instance, I have up to 32,000 people behind a handful of public IP addresses.

And yes I do regularly see problems where blocks have been put in place, and from what I can see this is a problem that is widely shared amongst people who NAT.

And once you are blocked in this way, you may be able to get it removed if you manage to identify which blocklist you are on, stop the network abuse and it has a well-run mechanism for removal. Most blocklists (including the ones I run) don’t work this way.

Every IP address has a reputation associated with it, and if you share a public IP address that has a poor reputation, parts of the Internet will disappear for you, and these include some well known services.

Jan 192017
 

Entropy.

Any serious cryptographic routines needs a good source of random numbers, and whilst Linux provides a random number generator by default it’s sources of entropy can be somewhat limited. Especially when you’re talking about a virtual machine.

Indeed if you try to pull too much randomness out of the Linux entropy pool (especially when it is especially limited), what you get might not be quite as random as you expect.

Which is where hardware randomness generators come in. And I finally have one (actually two), and have hooked them up. You may be able to guess what time I plugged it in from the graph below :-

So what real world difference does it make?

Well nothing is dramatically obvious, but :-

  1. I have slightly more confidence that any cryptographic software I might run has a good source of randomness and is less likely to accidentally perform poorly (in terms of cryptographic strength).
  2. Some cryptographic software blocks if the Linux entropy pool is empty; with a hardware source I can be more confident that any performance issues are not due to a lack of randomness.
Nov 262016
 

(actually we don’t usually sit in the data centre; it’s too noisy and usually the wrong temperature for people)

There is a perception amongst people that security “gurus” who work in network security are spying on all your network traffic. Not the hackers (which is a whole other matter), but the people who run enterprise firewalls. We do, but we’re not interested in what you are doing but instead what is being done to you (and the enterprise as a whole).

Frankly nothing strikes me as more boring than spying on someone’s porn browsing – if I really need to, I’ll hunt down my own porn thank you very much! And we’re busy; you could probably double the size of every network security team in every organisation on the planet and still nobody would be sitting around twiddling their thumbs.

On the subject of porn (as an extreme example), it is not a security issue. There is an argument that browsing porn sites is putting yourself at greater risk of picking up some kind of nasty infection, but avoiding porn sites to avoid getting infected with malware is a tactic that results in your computer being infected. So the intended content isn’t a problem as far as security is concerned, but we’re interested in unintended content.

Now there are places that enforce browsing censorship – blocking anything that isn’t work-related. That role is usually dumped on the network security people because they have the tools to do the job.

Does porn browsing on the office matter? Of course it does – some people are upset by the sight of such things, and almost as important, when someone is browsing porn they are not working. But such matters are best dealt with in the office by the line manager – if someone isn’t doing their work it doesn’t matter if they are browsing porn, hitting Facebook, or snoozing under the desk. All should be dealt with appropriately by the line manager.

And centralised censorship is a rather clumsy tool – blocking Facebook is all very well if it is to prevent personal usage of the Internet, but what about the Marketing department using Facebook for publicity? Or the Customer Service department keeping an eye on Facebook for product problems that they need to look into? These can be allowed through on a case-by-case basis, but it highlights that censorship is a clumsy tool.

The word from a nameless vendor who is in this space, is that in many cases this censorship has less to do with preventing people from doing “naughty” things, and more to do with controlling bandwidth usage. And as bandwidth becomes cheaper, there is less interest in censoring Internet activities – certainly from a personal perspective I notice a decrease in the number of people who complain they cannot visit certain sites because of work’s “firewall”.

There is also the subject of TLS inspection where firewalls intercept and inspect TLS or SSL encrypted traffic between you and “out there”. Again there is a suspicion that we are for whatever reason spying on your activities. The answer to this is the same as previously – why should we bother? It is too much like hard work, and frankly most of the information that passes through a firewall is unbelievably boring.

No, TLS interception is used to do the boring task of inspecting traffic for malware, spyware, and other security threats. And with the increasing use of TLS to encrypt traffic it is becoming more and more important to do TLS interception for security reasons.

Yes there are those who would use that sort of technology to spy on your activities, but those organisations are typically nation states … and repressive ones at that. But it is extreme foolishness to blame a useful tool for the abuses that an abusive government perpetrates.  Your average enterprise just isn’t that interested in what you’re up to.

And if you still don’t believe this, there is a simple answer: Do anything private on your own private network.

b84v37631-cubist-eye

Oct 222016
 

Yesterday lots of people found the Internet disappearing on them due to a significant DDoS attack against the DNS infrastructure of one company. Now there are all sorts of suggested fixes for this sort of problem, some of which are useful.

However it is notable that people have not mentioned one method built into DNS which could have been used more effectively. Indeed one suggestion was for the DNS to do something it already does – caching.

When you ask your ISP’s DNS servers to resolve a name such as example.org, the answer that your ISP’s DNS server gets back contains several bits of information in addition to the answer you are interested in (the IP address to connect to). One of which is how long to cache the value for, which means that your ISP’s DNS servers can save themselves some work for as long as they are allowed to cache the answer for.

Now it is awfully convenient to set this value to something like 5 minutes because if you have a need to change the value, it is nice to have the value change as quickly as possible.

But it also increases your vulnerability to a weaknesses in the DNS infrastructure.

If you increase the time-to-live (TTL) value to something more like 24 hours, then your DNS servers (or more usually the DNS servers of your DNS service provider) are required less frequently which means that if something takes them offline for any reason then there would be a decreased impact. It will still stop some people from getting the DNS answers they need, but the proportion unable to get an answer will drop dramatically.

 

damascus-dns

Sep 282016
 

One of the things that has happened recently was that a commentator on security matters (Brian Krebs) was taken offline by a massive denial of service attack, which (not so) mysteriously happened after he published an article on denial of service attacks. The short version of the story was that his site was hit by a denial of service attack totalling approximately 650Gbps (that’s roughly 6,000 times as much network bandwidth as your typical broadband connection), when his denial of service protection threw their hands up in the air and said: “That’s too much like hard work for a pro-bono service” and gave him 2 hours to move his site.

Google helpfully provided an alternative with Project Shield, and the site was reasonable quickly available again. And to be fair to the original denial of service attack providers (which I’m not naming), this level of attack was sufficient to cause problems to their paying customers and protecting from this level of attack is very expensive.

And indeed paying for denial of service protection is very expensive; the income for the entire lifetime of this blog site would pay for approximately 2 hours of protection. If that.

There are two aspects to this attack, although to be honest neither are particularly new.

The first is technical. Most distributed denial of service attacks are quite simple in nature – you simply ask a question of a dumb “server” with the return address of the site you want to attack. If you send out enough questions to enough dumb “servers” (which can actually be simple workstations or even Internet of Things devices), then you can overwhelm most sites on the Internet.

There are two fixes for this :-

  1. Don’t run dumb and insecure servers.
  2. ISP’s should stop allowing people to forge addresses on network traffic (Ingres Filtering or BCP38).

The second fix is the simplest method, but given how successful the decades long campaign for ISPs to do ingres filtering has been, tackling both ISPs and dumb servers is worthwhile.

As this latest attack may have been chiefly by IoT devices simply sending requests to the victim, the implementation of ingres filtering may not have been of much use in this case, but it is still worthwhile – this attack is not the only one that is happening. Attacks are happening constantly. However, tackling these “dumb servers” that were controlled by the attacker is also a priority, and we need to start seeing concrete action by the ISPs to tackle their customers’ mismanaged networks (home networks in many cases) – aggressive filtering of infected customer networks, and customer notifications that include advice.

Of course ISPs are not going to like doing that just as IoT manufacturers don’t like paying more to make secure appliances. Well, it’s time to name and shame the worst offenders; the bad publicity may help to counteract the lack of incentive to invest in processes that don’t immediately help the bottom line.

The second aspect is rather more serious. We now have an Internet where it is relatively easy to silence anyone who says something you do not like – if you’re rich enough to hire a denial of service gang. Anyone that is who cannot afford protection from such gangs, and there are suspicions that some gangs also provide denial of service protection services.

And this story is not the first time it has happened, and we need to start thinking about mechanisms to keep smaller publishers online when attackers try to censor them. Unless we want all our media controlled by the big players of course.

2016-03-28-swamped bandstand.small

Jul 142016
 

One of the throw-away statistics I tripped over recently was that there are 5 new malware releases every second.  Now many of those new releases are variations on a theme – there are pieces of software designed to distort a piece of malware into a new piece of malware with the same functionality. This is done deliberately to evade anti-virus software.

And it works. Every so often I feed some strange mail attachments into virustotal to find out how widely it is recognised. It is not uncommon to find that only 2-3 will recognise it as malware out of 50-odd virus checkers on that site. So if you happen to be dumb enough to download and activate the attachment, your anti-virus checker has a roughly 5% chance of protecting you.

Not exactly what you should expect.

I recently sat through a sales pitch for a not-so-new corporate product that does anti-malware protection very differently. Of course it is also insanely expensive, so I will not mention the actual product, but it does offer something new. Protection against malware by checking and blocking behaviour.

Whilst they add all sorts of clever data analysis tricks, fundamentally anti-virus products recognise malware because they recognise the data that makes up the malware. If they don’t recognise the signature of the malware, then they do not know it is malware; so they have an incredibly difficult time recognising new malware releases.

But recognising malware based on behaviour is far more likely to successfully recognise malware – for example by recognising an attempt to make itself persistent in a way that an ordinary application does not do, and blocking it. Which is a far more practicable method of blocking malware (if it works!).

It is also something that should probably be built into operating systems, which to a certain extent already has been.

The New Defence

The New Defence

 

 

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